Approved For Release 2007/06/20 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080007-6

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

7 March 1983

Mr. Brian V. Kinney
Chief, Declassification and
Historical Research Branch
Records Management Division
Washington Headquarters Services
Room 1D517, Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Kinney:

Mr. E. E. Lowry's memorandum of 24 February 1983 entitled "Historical Research By a Former Presidential Appointee" forwarded to us for review a copy of three items consisting of additional "Notes" made from DOD documents during research for the memoirs of Thomas S. Gates.

We reviewed the notes and in all cases our classification actions have been taken under Section 1.3 (a) (4) of Executive Order 12356. Following is the record of our actions, using the same item numbers that you used on the "List of Attachments" which you sent with your request:

Item No. 1 consists of two pages of notes (headed #2 and #3) on a DOD memorandum of 20 October 1960. We have no objection to their use by Mr. Gates.

Item No. 2 is a page (headed #12) of notes on a DOD memorandum of 28 October 1960. The sentence on lines 4 and 3 from the bottom of the page: [redacted] 25X1

When this sentence is removed, we have no objection to the remainder of the page being released for use by Mr. Gates.

Item No. 3 consists of nine pages (headed #15 through#23) of notes on a DOD memorandum of 10 November 1960. If the following two references to CIA are deleted: [redacted] 25X1

we would have no objection to the release of all the pages in this item for use by Mr. Gates.

State Dept. review

OSD review(s)

DOWNGRADE TO CONFIDENTIAL WHEN SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURES

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We would like to confirm, however, that in accordance with your procedures we would like to conduct a final security review of Mr. Gates' manuscript prior to publication. Your copies of the Notes are returned herewith. We have marked our deletions as described above.

Sincerely,

25X1

Chief, Classification Review Division
Office of Information Services
Directorate of Administration

Enclosures
1. List of Attachments
2. Items on the List

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee w/encls
1 - CRD Liaison w/DOD w/encls
1 - CRD Chrono w/o encls

25X1 DDA/OIS/CRD/

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LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

1. Notes on Memo, 20 Oct 60, Subj: Political Leader for Laos, HR-103-Gates (TS)

2. Notes on Memo, 28 Oct 60, Subj: Situation in Laos, HR-112-Gates (TS)

3. Notes on Memo, 10 Nov 60, Subj: Talking Paper for Meeting w/Mr. Herter, HR-115-Gates (TS)

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Origin of Document: OSD

File Location: 02-74-38-2-1

Title of Document: Memo: BG. Edward Lansdale to Hayden Williams

Accession Number: 64A-2093

Date: 20 Oct. 1960

Security Class. Top Secret

Subject: Political Leader for Laos-1

Folder: Laos 0001.1

TOP SECRET

"We have given some thought to the problem of changing political leadership in Laos. We agree w/ Jack Irwin's belief that a change is necessary. Despite interim accommodations by Souvanna Phouma to U.S. requests, we believe that his attitude toward U.S. will remain unstable and that he is dedicated to principle of agreement w/ Pathet Lao.

– Qualifications for a new PM.

(1) Straightforward in U.S. not simply pro-Souvanna. Souvanna-Phouma should have given given us a firm lesson – this point, then to the French.

(2) Be acceptable to, and also the would harmoniously with, key leaders in the Army

(3) Political leadership qualities – administrative skill, energy, knowledge of Laos, mature judgment, political skill.

(4) Relatively honest

(5) Someone not violently opposed by U.S. Ambassador, Sarit and Diem.

– Personalities

(1) Boun Oum – best of the older leaders; savvy politically; good in public; honesty questionable

(2) Phoui: figure of contention between Army and civil leaders; especially younger elements in gov't; [illegible] of U.S.

(3) Quane – puzzling, didn't work good when decisive action on his part needed. Have saved Laos. Critic of Phoumi.

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CIA/[illegible]

Attach 1

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Origin of Document: (See Def. Cont. # SD-782)
File Location: 02-74-38-2-1
Title of Document: Memo: BG Edwin Lansdale to Hayden Williams
Accession Number: HA 2-893
Date: 20 Oct 1960
Security Class. Top Secret
Subject: Political Leader for Laos-2
Folder: Laos 00061

TOP SECRET

Personalities (cont'd)

(9) Col. Oudone [illegible] with all Laos, whether in the North or South. Good administrator; quite popular; instituted and ran the Civic Action program, which gave him insight and influence in Laos. Known to the village or "grass-roots" level the world. Phoumi has a fund but it is believed that Americans now on the scene could help patch this up.

(5) Phoumi: Shows some qualities of decisive leadership, but needs shoring up in political judgments. Closing identities will both in the south and with Thailand, would need lots of support from other Laos. Americans on the scene would have to have a most delicate role in keeping such support constant.

(6) Major Kham Ouane. The man who forced the Pathet Lao into backing up in Phong Saly. Americans and Filipinos who have met him would have rated him as "terrific" as an organizer and leader.

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Origin of Document: [redacted] SD
(ASD-ISA; Secdef Cont. No. SD-[redacted])
Title of Document: Memo for the Secretary
Date: 28 Oct. 68
Subject: Situation in Laos

File Location:
02-74-38-2-1
Accession Number:
64A 2093
Security Class.
Top Secret

Folder: Laos 091

TOP SECRET

Two segments of the problem

(1) Our relations w/ Souvanna Phouma Gov't: the degree to which we should support it and over what period of time?

(2) The manner and degree to which we should ~~support or~~ oppose ~~it over what per-~~ ~~of time~~ aid Phoumi and other anti-Communist forces, particularly Ouane and Houmphan in Region I.

Since early days of the camps, Regions III and I have been under Phoumi's control, such as it is, rather than that of the RLG. After ups and downs Region II, at least that part not under control of the PL, declared for Phoumi while Mr. Parsons and I were in SEA. Rel-ship between Phoumi, Ouane, Houmphan is friendly and there is some cooperation between them, but Region I remains nominally loyal to the RLG.

4 Actions Desirable: U.S. must furnishing supplies to Phoumi and to Region I. This must be continued and speeded up; Region I and Phoumi's forces do not appear to be well-trained; defeats at Paksane and Sam Neua lowered organization and morale); plans and firm execution of plans. (Corcoran and Brownfield at Savannakhet should take lead in political-military planning), place PEO personnel at Battalion level (if it is completely unacceptable to carry out this course of action through [redacted]) [redacted] (. . . .) If courses of action are not carried out or only half-heartedly, Phoumi's chances of survival will be slim.

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Origin of Document: DOD (ASD/ISA)

File Location: 62-74-38-2-1

Title of Document: Memo: ASD/ISA to Secdef

Accession Number: 64A-2093

Date: 10 Nov. 1965

Security Class. Top Secret

Subject: Talking Paper for Meeting w/ Mr. Herter re: Laos

TOP SECRET

Recommendations:

a. Prompt, vigorous action to help Phoui

b. Prompt, vigorous action to eliminate Kong Le along lines suggested in Deptel 444

c. Seek defection of 1st MR, royal request to Souvanna to resign, and royal designation of new Prime Minister.

d. Dispatch of concise message directing above actions.

e. Approval of added funding needed by PEO to meet emergency costs as well as increased defense support requirements for coming year as requested by CINCPEO and Embassy.

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Origin of Document: SD(ASD/ISA

Title of Document: Memo: ASD/ISA to Sec Def

Date: 10 November 1960

Subject: Talking Paper for Mtg. w/ Mr. Herter re: Laos

Location: D-2-74-38-2-1

Accession Number: 64A-2093

Security Class. Secret

SECRET

Chronology - Laos

1. 17 Aug. State - Defense Mtg.

a. Conclusions:
(1) Dillon: prime objectives were elim. of Kong Le and preservation of Gen Phoumi
(2) Dillon: should avoid commitments to legality of Souvanna Gouvt.
(3) Parsons: outgoing message would be explicit with re: to eliminating Kong Le.

b. Implementing message: Deptel 176 (18 Aug.) merely said that problems for U.S. were:
(1) Prevention of bloodshed
(2) Preservation of Army and anti-communist leadership (including Phoumi)
(3) Strive to bring about acceptable power balance of non-Communist elements which would eliminate Kong Le and restore authority and stability.

c. Reactions from Vientiane: In DEPTEL 355, Amb. Brown suggested a compromise solution based on Phoumi accepting Souvanna as PM w/ possibility of Phoumi being FM but not a cabinet member.

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No U/C - Date

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Origin of Document: OSD (ASD/ISA)
Title of Document: Memo: ASD/ISA to Secdef
Date: 10 November 1960
Subject: Talking Paper for Meeting w/ Mr. Herter re: Laos.

File Location: 02-74-38-2-1
Accession Number: 64A-2093
Security Class. SECRET

SECRET

Chronology - Laos

2. 23 Aug. State Defense Meeting

a. Conclusions:
(1) Phoumi, despite lack of popularity, was our best bet as staunch anti-communist.
(2) Would be given more explicit assurances of U.S. support and told U.S. willing to honor quickly any reasonable request.
(3) Had to trust Phoumi's military judgment.

b. Implementing Message: Substance of Conclusion transmitted in Depdel 226 (23 Aug.)

c. Reaction from Vientiane: When Phoumi requested emergency rice lift, Brown and Sounarath made as a condition the use of Sounarath's Air Laos planes, thus delaying the lift (until 29 Aug.) and diluting Phoumi's confidence in U.S.

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Origin of Document: OSD (ASD/ISA)
Title of Document: Memo: ASD/ISA to Secdef.
Date: 10 November 1960
Subject: Talking Papers for Mtg. w/ Mr. Herter re: Laos

File Location: 02-74-38-2-1
Accession Number: 64A-2093
Security Class. SECRET

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Chronology - Laos

3. 30 Aug. State - Defense Mtg.

a. Conclusions

(1) Concern over return of new cabinet from Luang Prabang to Vientiane, in view Kong Le's control of Vientiane.

(2) Sonvanna should be told immediately that U.S. would support his Gov't in dealing w/ Kong Le.

b. Implementing Messages

(1) Substance of conclusions.

(2) Realized Brown might not be able to go Luang Prabang immediately, but if not, Fromer should deliver assurances to Sonvanna in L.P.

c. Reactions from Vientiane: In DEPTEL 140 (31 Aug.) although [redacted] thought Sonvanna should be told now. Brown said, "I do not interpret your instructions as suggesting deliver message before duly constituted Gov't actually invested.... Message would almost certainly become known in L.P. and would further infuriate Kong Le.

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Origin of Document (ASD ISA) OSD

File Location: 09-74-38-2-1

Title of Document: Memo: ASD ISA to Sec Def

Accession Number: 64A-2093

Date: 10 November 1960

Security Class. SECRET

Subject: Talking Papers for Mtg. w/ Mr. Herter re: Laos

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Chronology - Laos

4. 14 Sept. State Defense Mtg.

a. Conclusions:

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(1) We should supply Phoumi, using Pol[redacted] facilities [redacted] in lieu of Vientiane channel (2) Take immediate action (3) Tell Phoumi and Phouma what U.S. is doing

25X1

(4) If Souvanna doesn't resign by 16 Sept., Brown go see King - tell him call together personnages including Souvanna and Phoumi, and order them to agree on a cabinet including Phoumi and Souvanna. Tell Phoumi about demarche to King.

b. Implementing Messages. DEPTELS 315 and 316 (16 Sept.) transmitted substance & conclusion.

c. Reactions from Vientiane.

(1) In view of Souvanna's hesitancy, told Brown that Phoumi Vonavichit (PL) said he had ordered PL stop fighting in Sam Neua, after Souvanna's ordering RLA issued order FAL to counter-attack if PL do not cease fire. Brown decides this means FAL taking positive action re Sam Neua, and thus delayed for 48 hours implementation of DEPTEL 316.

(2) In reply to DEPTEL 316, Brown stresses that we cannot afford to support Phoumi, says he wants "to be sure that Souvanna understands immediate obstacles and risks involved in a demarche to get the King to form new govt."

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Origin of Document: D
(ASD/ISA)
Title of Document: Memo · ASD/ISA to SecDef
Date: 10 November 1960
Subject: Talking Paper for Meeting w/ Mr. Herter re: Laos

File Location:
02-74-38-2-1
Accession Number:
64A-2093
Security Class.
SECRET

SECRET

Chronology - Laos

5. 7 October State - Defense Mtg.

a. Conclusions:
(1) In view of King's unwillingness to assume responsibility, U.S. must make last desperate effort to work w/ Souvanna as legal facade for supporting FAL. (2) If this effort fails, U.S. must seek alternative of exclusive support of anti-Communists, ignoring Souvanna.

b. Implementing message: DEPTEL 384 (8 Oct.), in order to implement the conclusions, proposed four conditions to be met by Souvanna, in order to earn U.S. confidence and support:
1) Move govt to Luang Prabang, (2) Control Laos, (3) Safeguard Treasury, (4) Resist from Negotiations with PL.

c. Reactions from Vientiane, Bowles said would be difficult to implement points 1 and 4 of DEPTEL 384. (As of 9 November, none of the conditions in DEPTEL 384 have been met.).

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Approved For Release 2007/06/20 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080007-6

Origin of Document: (ISA)
File location: 202-14-38-2-1
Title of Document: Memo: ASD/ISA to Secdef
Accession Number: 6K-A 2093
Date: 10 November 1962
Security Class. SECRET
Subject: Talking Paper for Mtg. w/ Mr. Herter re Laos

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Chronology - Laos:

6. 22 October State - Defense Meeting (working level).

a. Conclusions:

(1) Most urgent problem is to get rid of Kong Le.

b. Implementing Message. DEPTEL 444 (22 Oct.) was a plan to remove Kong Le and 2nd Paratroop Battalion from Vientiane by transfer if possible or by force if necessary.

c. Reactions from Vientiane. Brown never commented on this plan, apparently accepting Saed Souvanna transferred Kong Le from 2nd Para to ministry of Defense is a "removal." Fact that Kong Le is still "clearing" decisions made in Vientiane attests to his continuing influence.

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HR-115 Date

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Origin of Document: OSD (ASD ISA)

Title of Document:
Memo: ASD ISA to Sec Def
Date: 10 November 1960
Subject: Talking paper for Sec meeting w/ Mr. Herter re: Laos

69-74-38-2+1
Accession Number:
64A-2093
Security Class.
SECRET

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Chronology - Laos

1. 28 October State - Defense Mtg.

a. Conclusions:

(1) Souvanna's usefulness in achieving essential U.S. objectives is about at an end.

(2) His use of U.S. can be very damaging.

(3) Souvanna has not acted on any of DEPTEL 384 conditions.

(4) Souvanna is losing support of non-Communist leadership in Laos.

(5) China is opposed to Souvanna.

(6) Souvanna will not be able to remain FAL and country to meet PL threat.

b. Implementing Message: DEPTEL 466 (28 Oct.) was a plan to encourage replacement of Souvanna as Prime Minister by Phoui, returning to Laos from France.

c. Reactions from Vientiane. Brown in DEPTEL 861 rejected the plan for Phoui to be PM, pointing out how well Souvanna was getting along. State and Defense agreed on rejection of Brown's reclama, and directed that Phoui be encouraged to go to Laos and proceed to gather support for himself.

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HR-11-Letter

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Origin: (ASD/ISA)
Title of Document: Memo: ASD/ISA to Secretary
Date: 10 November 1960
Subject: Talking paper for meeting w/ Mr. Herter re: Laos

Accession Number: 02-74-38-2 1
64A-2093
Security Class.
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Chronology - Laos

8. Status of Amb. Brown's Efforts to work with and through Souvanna's Gov't

a. Souvanna Phouma has:

(1) Had an adverse impact on Laotian relations w/ Thailand and South Vietnam.

b. Begun negotiations with the PL

c. Threatened to seek UN intervention.

d. Sought diplomatic relations w/ Soviet Bloc.

e. Has permitted formation of a committee for Neutrality and National Unity, which has all the earmarks of a classical Communist Front organization.

b. Souvanna Phouma has not:

1. Neutralized or eliminated Kong Le.
2. Reached agreement w/ Phoumi.
3. Reunified R. FAL.
4. Prevented bloodshed
5. Reunited country
6. Formed a secure and stable Gov't.
7. Gain the confidence of military, Senior generals, Communist leaders.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

February 24, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, CLASSIFICATION REVIEW DIVISION, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Historical Research By A Former Presidential Appointee

In accordance with the provisions of section 4.3 of Executive Order 12356 and implementing regulations, Mr. Thomas S. Gates has been authorized access to records in OSD files that he originated, reviewed, signed or received while he served as Deputy Secretary of Defense (May-December 1959) and Secretary of Defense (December 1959-January 1961).

During research for the Gates memoirs, the attached notes have been made from classified material originated by your agency or from classified subject matter of possible interest to you. This office is responsible for ascertaining your opinion as to whether these notes may be used in the preparation of the Gates book which is to be published in unclassified form. If your judgement is that the notes cannot be released in their entirety, please indicate those portions which need to be excised in order to make the notes releasable. It should be emphasized that you are not being asked to review for declassification the documents from which the notes were taken. I request that you examine the attached notes and inform this office as soon as possible, but no later than 60 days from the date of this memorandum, whether you approve their release. Please return the notes when your review has been completed. It is likely that we will be sending you additional notes as the research for the Gates memoirs progresses.

In accordance with established DoD procedures, Mr. Gates will be required to submit the manuscript of the memoirs to this office for a final security review prior to publication.

Brian Mitchell for
E. E. Lowry, Jr.
OSD Records Administrator

Attachments (3)

UNCLASSIFIED

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS

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